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Abstract To devise efficient approaches and tools for detecting malicious packages in the Android ecosystem, researchers
are increasingly required to have a deep understanding of malware. There is thus a need to provide a framework for dissecting
malware and locating malicious program fragments within app code in order to build a comprehensive dataset of malicious
samples. Towards addressing this need, we propose in this work a tool-based approach called HookRanker, which provides
ranked lists of potentially malicious packages based on the way malware behaviour code is triggered. With experiments on
a ground truth of piggybacked apps, we are able to automatically locate the malicious packages from piggybacked Android
apps with an accuracy@5 of 83.6% for such packages that are triggered through method invocations and an accuracy@5 of
82.2% for such packages that are triggered independently.
Keywords Android, piggybacked app, malicious code, HookRanker
1 Introduction
Malware is pervasive in the Android ecosys-
tem. This is unfortunate since Android is the most
widespread operating system in handheld devices and
has increasing market shares in various home and office
smart appliances. As we now heavily depend on mobile
apps in various activities that pervade our modern life,
security issues with Android web browsers, media play-
ers, games, social networking or productivity apps can
have severe consequences. Yet, regularly, high profile
security mishaps with the Android platform shine the
spotlight on how easily malware writers can exploit a
large attack surface, eluding all detection systems both
at the app store level and at the device level.
Nonetheless, research and practice on malware de-
tection have produced a substantial number of ap-
proaches and tools for addressing malware. The litera-
ture contains a large body of such work[1-4]. Unfor-
tunately, the proliferation of malware[5] in stores and
on user devices is a testimony that 1) state-of-the-art
approaches have not matured enough to significantly
address malware, and 2) malware writers are still able
to react quickly to the capabilities of current detec-
tion techniques. Broadly, malware detection techniques
either leverage malware signatures or build machine
learning (ML) classifiers based on static/dynamic fea-
tures. On the one hand, it is rather tedious to manually
build a (near) exhaustive database of malware signa-
tures: new malware or modified malware is thus likely
to slip through. On the other hand, ML classifiers are
too generic to be relevant in the wild: features currently
used in the literature, such as n-grams, permissions or
system calls, allow to flag apps without providing any
hint on either which malicious actions are actually de-
tected, or where they are located in the app.
The challenges in Android malware detection are
mainly due to a lack of accurate understanding of
what constitutes a malicious code. In 2012, Zhou and
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Jiang[6] manually investigated 1 260 malware samples
to characterize: 1) their installation process, i.e., which
social engineering-based techniques (e.g., repackaging,
update-attack, drive-by-attack) are used to slip them
into users devices; 2) their activation process, i.e., which
events (e.g., SMS
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1 //Activity for launching the app
2 public class com.unity3d .player.UnityPlayerProxyActivity extends android .app.Activity {
3 protected void onCreate (android .os.Bundle ) {
4 $r0 := @this: com.unity3d .player.UnityPlayerProxyActivity;
5 $r1 := @parameter0: android .os.Bundle;
6 $b0 = 1;
7 specialinvoke $r0.<android .app.Activity : void onCreate (android .os.Bundle)>($r1);
8 + staticinvoke <com.gamegod .Touydig : void init(android .content .Context )>($r0);
9 $r2 = newarray (java.lang.String)[2];
10 $r2[0] = "com.unity3d .player.UnityPlayerActivity";
11 $r2[1] = "com.unity3d .player.UnityPlayerNativeActivity";
12 staticinvoke <com.unity3d .player.UnityPlayerProxyActivity: void
copyPlayerPrefs(android .content .Context ,java.lang.String []) >($r0 , $r2);
13 }}
14
15 // Broadcast Receiver for listening PACKAGE_ADDED , CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE, and BOOT_COMPLETED events
16 + public class com.mobile.co.UR extends AdPushReceiver {...}
Listing 1. Example of Type1 and Type2 hooks. This snippet is extracted from a real piggybacked app named apscallion.sharq2. The
“+” sign indicates the code that was injected into the origin app.
Type2 hook for piggybacked malicious apps, where the
malicious rider code is triggered through the use of An-
droid event system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides the necessary background informa-
tion related to piggybacked apps, including the piggy-
backing terminology to which we will refer in this pa-
per. Section 3 presents our approach for automatically
locating malicious packages in piggybacked apps. We
evaluate our work in Section 4 and discuss the threats
to validity as well as outlook in Section 5. Section 6
discusses related work and Section 7 concludes this pa-
per.
2 Preliminaries
We now provide preliminary details that are essen-
tial for understanding the purpose, techniques and key
concerns of Android piggybacking. In particular, we
first briefly introduce the terminology related to the
piggybacking process in Subsection 2.1. Then, in Sub-
section 2.2, we present the Android app launch model,
which is central to how malicious packages in piggy-
backed apps can be reached for triggering malicious be-
haviour. Next, we summarize in Subsection 2.3 the
techniques that are leveraged by malware writers to
graft piggybacking code with existing app code. Fi-
nally, in Subsection 2.4, we present the ground truth
dataset that we use in this work to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of HookRanker.
2.1 Piggybacking Terminology
We now introduce the necessary terminology to
which we will refer in the remainder of this paper.
Fig.1 shows the constituting parts of a piggybacked
malware 2○, which is built by taking a given original
app, referred to in the literature as the carrier[12], and
grafting malicious packages to it (also known as a piece
of malicious code 3○), referred to as the rider. The ma-
licious behaviour will be triggered thanks to the hook
that is inserted by the malware writer to ensure the
injected packages will be executed.
Android Apps
Malware
Piggybacked
Carrier Rider
Piggybacked
APP (a)
Hook
Original
APP (a)
Fig.1. Piggybacking terminology.
It is also noteworthy that, in this work, we make a
clear difference between piggybacking and repackaging,
two terms that are frequently used in the literature. In-
deed, unlike piggybacking, repackaging does not neces-
sarily include a modification of the bytecode of a given
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Android app. Instead, repackaging may simply be per-
formed to change the app certificate and thus switch
the ownership. However, piggybacking always implies
repackaging.
2.2 Android App Launch Model
Android apps are made up of four types of compo-
nents:
• Activity, which represents the graphical interface
of Android apps;
• Service, which is dedicated to performing time-
intensive tasks in the background;
• Broadcast Receiver, which is used in waiting
and resolving system as well as user-defined events;
• Content Provider, which provides a standard in-
terface for other components/apps to access app data.
Unlike traditional Java applications, which include
a single entry point (i.e., the main() function) to
launch the program, Android apps contain multiple en-
try points through which some parts of the app code
can be triggered: basically every component could be
an entry point. This situation can be exploited by pig-
gybackers as opportunities for triggering the execution
of their injected malicious packages. Fig.2 summarizes
typical examples of the common launch model of An-
droid apps. It illustrates that in addition to the normal
launch process (launcher), Android apps can actually
be triggered through system events and user-defined
events.
Service
Receiver 2
Activity
Launcher
System
Events
User Events
IF
IF
IF
Activity
System
System
Intent
Fig.2. Examples of the Android app launch model. IF indicates
intent filter.
Actually, the three aforementioned entry point
types are based on the inter-component communication
(ICC) mechanism. Each entry point (i.e., component)
has to declare at least one 4○ intent filter to specify how
it could be launched. In order to be a launcher entry
point, as shown in Listing 2, the launcher component
(activity in this case) has to declare an intent filter with
an action attribute named MAIN and a category at-
tribute named LAUNCHER (lines 24∼25). Similarly,
in order to be a system event-triggered entry point, a
component (usually receiver) must declare intent filters
to listen for some system events. When the declared
system events are fired, the component will be trig-
gered. Both a launcher entry point and a system event
triggered entry point can be used to start an app, but
they differ by the fact that a launcher entry point can
also be triggered via user events, e.g., an intent object
(with MAIN and LAUNCHER attributes filled) con-
structed with explicit targets in mind.
20 <manifest package ="rapscallion.sharq2">
21 <application >
22 activity :". UnityPlayerProxyActivity"
23 intent-filter
24 action:"android .intent.action.MAIN"
25 category "android .intent.category .LAUNCHER "
26
27 receiver :"com.mobile.co.UR"
28 intent-filter
29 action:"android .intent.action. PACKAGE_ADDED"
30 data:"package "
31 intent-filter
32 action:"android .net.conn.CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE"
33 intent-filter
34 action:"android .intent.action. BOOT_COMPLETED"
35 </application ></manifest >
Listing 2. Simplified manifest of app apscallion.sharq2.
2.3 Hook Types
Given the app launch model described above, we
infer that there are two ways for piggybackers to hook
their malicious code from the carrier code, i.e., to allow
the triggering of the payload in their injected malicious
packages. We refer to these two ways as Type1 hooks
and Type2 hooks.
• Type1 hook involves method calls that explicitly
connect carrier code to rider code. In this case, we iden-
tify the hook via the point 5○ where the carrier code is
switched into the rider code in the execution flow. List-
ing 1 shows a snippet illustrating an example of Type1
hook (line 8), which is inserted immediately at the be-
ginning of the onCreate() method (line 7) of component
UnityPlayerProxyAct. As shown in Listing 2, Unity-
PlayerProxyActivity is actually the app launcher, as in-
dicated by theMAIN action and LAUNCHER category.
When users launch the app, the first lifecycle method
onCreate() of component UnityPlayerProxyActivity will
be triggered. Consequently, the malicious packages
(starting from class com.gamegod.Touydig) will immedi-
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ately be triggered (by calling the method init()), switch-
ing the current execution context to piggybacked code.
• Type2 hook involves the use of the Android event
system. Thus, the piggybacked code hooking is done
via a component that is explicitly connected to any
code of the original app. Instead, the (malicious)
rider code will be triggered directly by system or user-
defined events. Listing 1 also includes an example
of Type2 hook (line 16), where the whole component
named com.mobile.co.UR is injected during piggyback-
ing. Listing 2 illustrates the capabilities declared for
this component, which is registered to listen to three
different system events: 1) PACKAGE
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Fig.4. Overview of our approach.
now detail these two approaches in Subsection 3.1 and
Subsection 3.2 respectively.
3.1 Type1 Hook Identification
To automate this approach, we consider the iden-
tification of Type1 hook as a graph analysis problem.
Fig.5 illustrates the package dependency graph (PD-
Graph) of a piggybacked app (the same app as we used
in Listing 1). PDGraph is a directed graph which makes
explicit the dependency between packages. The values
reported on the edges correspond to the times a call is
made by code from package A to a method in package
B. These values are considered as the weights of the
relationships between packages. In some cases, how-
ever, this static weight may not reflect the relationship
strength between packages since a unique call link be-
tween two packages can be used multiple times at run-
time. To attenuate the importance of the weight we also
consider a scenario where weights are simply ignored.
com⊲umeng⊲common ↼↽
com⊲umeng⊲xp ↼↽
com⊲unityd⊲player ↼↽
com⊲gamegod ↼↽
org⊲fmod ↼↽
com⊲umeng⊲analytics ↼↽
com⊲mobile⊲co ↼↽
com⊲ah⊲mf ↼↽
com⊲android⊲kode⌢p ↼↽
1
4
4
132
1
4
4
3
6
Fig.5. Package dependency graph of a piggybacked app. Num-
bers between parentheses indicate the unweighted indegree val-
ues while numbers near edge lines indicate weighted indegree
values.
We now compute four metrics for estimating the re-
lationships between packages in an app.
1)Weighted Indegree. In a directed graph, the inde-
gree of a vertex is the number of headpoints adjacent to
the vertex. In the PDGraph, the weighted indegree of
a package corresponds to the number of calls that are
made from code in other packages to methods in that
package.
2) Unweighted Indegree. We compute the normal
indegree of a package in the PDGraph by counting the
number of packages that call its methods. The reason
why we take into account indegree as a metric is based
on the assumption that hackers take the least effort to
present the hook. As an example, com.gamegod in Fig.5
is actually the entry-point of the rider code, which has
a smallest indegree for both weighted and unweighted
indegree.
3) Maximum Shortest Path. Given a package, we
compute the shortest path to every other package, and
then we consider the maximum path to reach any ver-
tex. The intuition behind this metric is based on our
investigation with samples of piggybacked apps, which
shows that malware writers usually hide malicious ac-
tions far away from the hook, i.e., the multiple call
jumps from the triggering call. Thus, the maximum
shortest path in the rider module can be significantly
higher than that in carrier code.
4) Energy. We estimate the energy of a vertex
(package in the PDGraph) as an iterative sum of its
weighted outdegrees and that of its adjacent packages.
Thus, the energy of a package is total sum weight of all
packages that can be reached from its code. The energy
value helps to evaluate the importance of a package in
the stability of a graph (i.e., how relevant is the sub-
graph headed by this package?).
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The above metrics are useful for identifying pack-
ages which are entry-points into the rider code. We
build a ranked list of the packages based on a likeli-
hood score that a package is the entry point package of
the rider code. Let vi be the value computed for a met-
ric i described above (i = 1, 2 for in-degree metrics, the
smaller, the better; i = 3, 4 for the others, the bigger
the better), and wi is the weight associated to metric i.
For a PDGraph graph with n package nodes, the score
associated to a package p, with our proposed metrics,
is provided by (1).
sp =
2∑
i=1
wi × (1 −
vi(p)
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resolve incoming intents because both actions and cat-
egories need to be matched. As a result, the more cate-
gories declared for a given intent filter (or component),
the less likely the component will be executed.
The above information can be used as metrics for
computing the likelihood scores of components to be
used as Type2 hooks. Based on these scores, we can
build a ranked list of the components to recommend
potential Type2 hooks. Let m be the total number of
intent filters declared by component c, fi be the score
of the i-th intent filter of component c, and wi be the
weight associated to fi, the score of the component sc
can be computed through (3).
sc =
m∑
i=1
wi × fi. (3)
We can further calculate fi through (4), where p
and q denote the number of actions and categories of fi
respectively, aj and gk stand for the score of the j-th
action and the k-th category of fi respectively while wj
and wk are the weights associated to aj and gk, respec-
tively.
fi =
p∑
j=1
wj × aj −
q∑
k=1
wk × gk. (4)
In our experiments, we give a base score 1 to all ac-
tions and categories appearing for intent filters of com-
ponents, i.e., ∀j, k, aj = 1 and gk = 1. We also weight
all metrics except action similarly, i.e., ∀i, k, wi = 1 and
wk = 1. For metric action, because of its importance,
we weight it through a mapping illustrated in Table 1.
The “count” column shows the number of occurrences
of the action indicated in the first column in all the pig-
gybacked apps that we have considered. The weight is
computed through the natural logarithm (base 10) of
the count number (e.g., 4 = ⌈log(1 693)⌉).
Table 1. Mapping from Action to Its Weight
1116 J. Comput. Sci. & Technol., Nov. 2017, Vol.32, No.6
0 
32% 
1 
54% 
2 
7% 
3 
3% 
>3 
4% 
0 
15% 
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Fig.7. Distribution of piggybacked apps on Type1 and Type2
hooks. The text in each fan (i.e., x
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where we consider an app verified as long as one of its
hooks is located, HookRanker yields an accuracy@5 (we
check the top 5 packages) of 89.4% for Type1 hooks and
an accuracy@5 (we only check the top 5 components)
of 99.5% for Type2 hooks if any one hook is matched.
In the case of Match All Hooks, where we consider an
app is verified if and only if all of its hooks are located,
HookRanker yields an accuracy@5 of 83.6% for Type1
hooks and an accuracy@5 of 82.2% for Type2 hooks.
For such apps that have more than five hooks, we con-
sider them to be not verified.
Table 2. Hook Identification Results (Accuracy@5)
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Answer to RQ2. HookRanker is efficient in locating
both Type1 and Type2 hooks. Our in-depth analysis
on the located malicious packages further discloses that
1) piggybacking process is likely performed in batches;
2) Broadcast Receiver is the most adopted component
type for implementing Type2 hooks.
4.3 RQ3 — Rider-Based Malware Detection
After collecting snippets of malicious rider code
from piggybacked apps, we now explore their potential
for improving malware detection approaches.
4.3.1 Basic Malware Detection
In a first scenario, we consider the case of machine
learning (ML) based malware detection leveraging fea-
tures of the identified rider code in our ground truth
of piggybacked apps. The malware prediction in this
case is a one-class classification problem as we only con-
sider features (malicious packages) that malware sam-
ples exhibit. For this experiment, we consider each
malicious package as a distinct feature, e.g., package
“com.gamegod” shown in Fig.5 is thus a feature in our
feature set; if a given app has a package starting with
“com.gamegod”, we set the value of (“com.gamegod”)
feature to “TRUE” (“FALSE”, otherwise). We first
apply the classifier built with these new features on our
ground truth. In 10-fold cross-validation experiments,
using the RandomForest classification algorithm[23], we
have recorded an accuracy of 91.6% in identifying An-
droid malware. These results suggest that rider code
features are effective in detecting piggybacked malware.
It is worth mentioning that our objective in this
work is not to propose an ML-based malware detection
approach that outperforms the state of the art. Instead,
we simply show that collected malicious packages are
recurrent and promising ingredients for discriminating
malware from benign apps. Therefore, it is expected
that the accuracy achieved by our approach may not
be so good as the state-of-the-art ones. Nevertheless,
we believe well-designed fine-grained features based on
such collected malicious packages would lead to better
results. However, to explore this interesting direction
is out of the scope of this work and therefore we take it
as our future work.
We further investigate the MalGenome dataset to
determine the proportion of malicious apps which share
the same malicious packages with the piggybacked apps
of our ground truth. To that end we consider the pack-
age dependency graph of each app of the MalGenome
dataset and map them with the collection of rider
package pairs collected in our ground truth. 125
MalGenome apps contain only one package. They are
thus irrelevant for our study. Among those apps with
several packages, 252 (i.e., 22.2%) contain rider code
features of our ground truth. With a malware detec-
tion tool based on our rider code collection, we could
have directly flagged such apps with no further analysis.
4.3.2 Malware Family Classification
In a second scenario, we consider the case of classi-
fying malware to specific families based on the rider
features. To that end, we consider the apps of our
ground truth dataset and apply our dissection ap-
proach. We then collect the identified rider pack-
ages of all apps where each package represents a dis-
tinct feature, and apply the Expectation-Maximization
(EM)[24] algorithm on the edges related to rider code
in the app PDGraph to cluster them. This leads to the
construction of five clusters of varying sizes. Here the
number of clusters (5) is directly computed by the EM
algorithm, which is able to infer a suitable number of
clusters to optimize the distance among clusters. Our
objective is then to investigate whether the clusters of
rider code are also related to specific malware families.
In this paper, we consider the labels 12○ that anti-virus
products from VirusTotal provide after analysing the
piggybacked apps corresponding to the rider code in
each cluster. Other familial classification studies such
as the one presented by Fan et al.[25], where frequent
subgraph (to represent the common behavior or mal-
ware) is leveraged, could be also leveraged to achieve
the same purpose (i.e., to build Android malware fam-
ilies).
dJaccard(fa, fb) =
|fa ∪ fb| − |fa ∩ fb|
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distant from those of any other clusters. This suggests
that the dissected rider code contributes to malware of
specific families.
Table 5. Number of Apps and Anti-Virus Labels of the
Clusters Built Based on Rider Code
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which aim at preventing Android apps from being re-
verse engineered and further repackaged, HookRanker
is also not able to tackle packed piggybacked mali-
cious apps. Fortunately, state-of-the-art approaches
including DexHunter[29] and PackerGrind[30] have al-
ready demonstrated promising results for extracting
DEX code from those packed apps, making it still pos-
sible for HookRanker to tackle packed apps and thereby
to locate malicious packages.
• Finally, it is hard to know whether a given mal-
ware is piggybacked from other apps (because of lack-
ing ground truth) or is built from scratch by “bad”
guys. As HookRanker will attempt to yield ranked
lists of packages and components in any case, apply-
ing our approach to non-piggybacked malware may
result in false alarms. In other words, HookRanker
should not be applied to normal malware developed
from scratch, because the enumerated potential hooks
might mislead the analysis of security analysts. To mit-
igate this, we argue that there is a need to automati-
cally infer piggybacked apps, even when the original
app is not “known” (e.g., identifying piggybacked apps
through machine learning based techniques[31] or symp-
toms based approaches[32]). Nonetheless, it is out of
the scope of this paper to automatically identify piggy-
backed apps. We take it as our future work.
As for future work, we also plan to directly per-
form our graph analysis in the class or method level,
where the fine-grained results could be more accurate
for analysts to identify malicious behaviours and for
rider-based malware classifiers. Furthermore, we would
like to investigate other means (e.g., community de-
tection on the built graph) to improve the accuracy
of our approach. Finally, we plan to conduct a user
study and consequently to understand to what ex-
tend HookRanker can help analysts dissect piggybacked
apps, where their original counterparts are unknown.
Last but not the least, the findings of our ap-
proach, namely the hook and the rider code, could be
used to boost many more implications. In addition
to the one we have demonstrated in RQ3, where we
have shown how our results can be leveraged for mal-
ware detection, another potential implication is to ex-
ploit the hook/rider code to develop an automatic app
repair/blocking approach which disconnects the rider
code or disassembles the hook so that the malicious
payload would not be triggered. As demonstrated by
Li et al.[9], third-party libraries are frequently compro-
mised to include malicious payloads. Therefore, based
on a whitelist of known libraries[15,33-35], it is possible
to supplement this work with a comparison between
released and in-app library code. If the in-app library
code is substantially different from the known publicly
released version, it hints on probable attack on the li-
brary code (e.g., hook introduction to trigger malicious
code). Moreover, since our approach provides quanti-
tative outputs (i.e., the rank), it could be utilized to
rank Android apps based on the extent of the suspi-
ciousness on their malicious status. This ranking can
benefit app vetting processes for both end users and
security analysts.
6 Related Work
In a recent study with anti-virus products, re-
searchers have shown that malware is still widespread
within Android markets[36]. This finding is in line
with regular reports from anti-virus companies where
they reveal that Android has become the most tar-
geted platform by malware writers. Research on sys-
tematic detection of Android malware is nevertheless
still maturing[9]. Machine learning techniques, by al-
lowing sifting through large sets of applications to de-
tect malicious applications based on measures of simi-
larity of features, appear to be promising for large-scale
malware detection[4,37-39].
Cesare and Xiang[40] proposed to use similarity on
control flow graphs to detect variants of known mal-
ware. Chen et al.[10] presented an approach named
MassVet that compares a submitted app with all those
existing ones in a market, vetting Android apps based
on the commonality in UI structures and differences
in components. Eventually, their approach suspects a
given app of being malicious based on unusual compo-
nents. Our work however focuses on analyzing each app
to highlight potential components which contribute to
the malicious payloads. Hu et al.[41] described SMIT,
a scalable approach relying on pruning function Call
Graphs of x86 malware to reduce the cost of computing
graph distances. SMIT leverages a vantage point tree
but for large-scale malware indexing and queries. Simi-
larly, BitShred[42] focuses on large-scale malware triage
analysis by using feature hashing techniques to dramat-
ically reduce the dimensions in the constructed malware
feature space. After reduction, pair-wise comparison is
still necessary to infer similar malware families[43].
PiggyApp[12] is the work that focuses on piggy-
backed app detection. The authors improved over their
previous work, namely DroidMoss[44], which was deal-
ing with repackaged app detection. PiggyApp, simi-
lar to our approach, is based on the assumption that
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a piece of code added to an already existing app will
be loosely coupled with rest of the application’s code.
Consequently, given an app, PiggyApp builds its pro-
gram dependency graph, and assigns weights to the
edges in accordance to the degree of relationship be-
tween the packages. Then, it uses an agglomerative
algorithm to cluster the packages and thereby to select
the primary module of the app, which is further lever-
aged to highlight piggybacked apps by comparing with
other selected primary modules. To escape the scala-
bility problem with pair-wise comparisons, the authors
of [12] relied on the vantage point tree data structure
to partition the metric space and eventually to detect
piggybacked apps. The identified piggybacked apps can
be taken as the input of our approach.
Researchers use a set of diverse features to detect
malware. In 2012, Sahs and Khan[4] built an Android
malware detector with features based on a combina-
tion of Android-specific permissions and a control-flow
graph representation. Use of permissions and API calls
as features was proposed by Wu et al.[45] In 2013, Amos
et al.[46] leveraged dynamic application profiling in their
malware detector. Demme et al.[1] also used dynamic
application analysis to profile malware. Yerima et al.[2]
built malware classifiers based on API calls, external
program execution and permissions. Canfora et al.[3]
experimented feature sets based on SysCalls and per-
missions. Zhang et al.[47] used weighted contextual API
dependency graphs as program semantics to classify
Android malware, where they leveraged graph simila-
rity metrics to disclose homogeneous app behavior.
Unfortunately, through extensive evaluations, the
community of ML-based malware detection has not
yet shown that current malware detectors for Android
are actually efficient in detecting malware in the wild.
Chief reason among the candidate ones to this situation
is the fact that features are “elaborated” by research
teams based on the behaviour of specific malware fami-
lies whose behavioural description has provided the in-
tuitions for constructing the classifiers. Furthermore,
because most malware is actually piggybacked from be-
nign apps, the ML-based features are probably similar
to those extracted from benign apps, making them in-
distinguishable for ML-based malware detection (e.g.,
due to the multi-generation repackaging problem[48]).
Indeed, as pointed out by Meng et al.[49], the cur-
rent feature-based malware detection approaches are
not enough because they cannot provide detailed in-
formation beyond their mere detection. They thus
proposed an alternative approach that leverages se-
mantic features (based on deterministic symbolic au-
tomaton (DSA)) to comprehensive Android malware
and thereby to detect and classify them. As another
example, Tian et al.[50] proposed an approach that
leverages code heterogeneity analysis to detect repack-
aged Android malware. Given an Android app, they
strategically partitioned its code structure into multi-
ple dependence-based regions, where each region is a
basic unit that will be independently classified on its
behavioural features.
Our work differs from them in a way that we actu-
ally focus on extracting the malicious packages (rider
code) from piggybacked apps. Based on the located
rider code, our approach can be used to compliment
those approaches by allowing them for better represen-
tation of features and better classification of malware,
e.g., through the implementation of multi-classifiers,
taking into account the different ways that exist for
writing malware (and indirectly different structures and
behaviours of malware).
7 Conclusions
We proposed in this paper an approach for dissect-
ing piggybacked apps to locate and collect malicious
samples. Through extensive evaluations, we demon-
strated the performance of our approach, i.e., the pre-
cision of locating hook/rider code. We also experimen-
tally showed that the collected malicious packages (i.e.,
rider code) can be leveraged to detect new malicious
apps. Further investigations revealed that rider code
clusters strongly correlated with the clusters character-
ized via malware signatures given by anti-virus prod-
ucts.
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